Denver Law Review
Volume 47

Issue 4

Article 22

January 1970

Saving Us From Ourselves: The Interaction of Law and ScienceTechnology: Comment
Philip L. Bereano

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Philip L. Bereano, Saving Us From Ourselves: The Interaction of Law and Science-Technology: Comment,
47 Denv. L.J. 671 (1970).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

COMMENT
By

P

PHILIP

L.

BEREANO

REPARATORY to the main comments I wish to make, let me say
that I have a somewhat different definition of technology than Dr.
Curlin. I look at it as encompassing more than just applied science, and
tend to include within it organizational and informational relationships.
Also, running through the discussion of technology, either implicitly,
or sometimes explicitly, is a very strong notion of elitism, to which I
react very negatively. I see elitism entering into decisionmaking in two
contexts. The first is the managerial sense - who decides and how. The
second is the problem of allocation, or in other words, to what problems
do we devote our resources. For example, the majority of people at
this conference have focused on what I would call the problems of elite
groups.
We have been concerned, as Dr. Curlin's paper indicates, with the
problems of heart transplants and definitions of death. I would submit
that these problems are trivial in the present social context. To concentrate our resources on genetic manipulation, rather than on the problem
of infant mortality, or the problem of child malnutrition, seems to me
to be folly, or even criminal. Similarly, to concentrate the resources,
as our private sector largely does, on muscular dystrophy, which affects
far fewer people than sickle cell anemia, seems to me to be inexplicable,
except when one realizes that sickle cell anemia is a disease that is largely
restricted to blacks. Similarly, references to abortion and the liberalization of the abortion statutes should be made with the realization that
the experience in New York State, in the 6 months since the abortion
law was liberalized, shows that the right and the ability to get an
abortion remains essentially a privilege of upper class, white women.
I submit that our society must begin to deal with problems such
as the above and not with the questions of heart transplants or genetic
manipulation - which are intellectually interesting, but which are
usually problems of elite groups. This is essentially why I have a very
negative opinion about much of "futurism." My argument is essentially
that futurists work with the false premise that our social problems
are largely due to surprise, while I believe that they are due to indifference. Therefore, I do not think we should be preoccupied with eventual
dilemmas of the future, when apparently we are unwilling to handle
present, contemporary problems which, in fact, we are capable of
handling.
I would define technology assessment in somewhat broader terms
than Mr. Coates. I perceive it as "technological planning." Planning has
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evolved from an architectually based setting, to questions of economic
development, and then, subsequently, into questions of social programs,
health care, and so on. I would submit that technology offers a suitable,
substantive area to which planning, as a process and as an intellectual
tool, can devote its attention. I believe that technology assessment is
in fact the application to technology of theories that have been developed in the planning process.
One of the strongest theories that has been developed within the
planning literature is the choice theory associated with Paul Davidoff
and Tom Reiner. Very clearly, the whole notion of values, as well as the
whole concept of normative considerations, is central to this theoretical
framework. Briefly, they see the planning process as one in which goals
are selected through a normative process, and means are either ascertained, or better still, created, so that they produce options and
alternatives which involve some normative consideration. Thus, I feel
that the value question is not sterile; in fact, it is fundamental. I consider
technology assessment to be a broad concept in which mixed socialtechnological questions are to be asked.
The fact is that decisions must be made, in spite of the theoretical
difficulties. That is to say, even though we cannot perform analyses
which are clean and neat, politically and socially we are making decisions. If we cannot justify these decisions "rationally," because they
are not clean and analytical, we have to look to other criteria, of which
one of the most important is that these decisions must be accepted by
people as being legitimate, accepted, most importantly, by those people
affected by the decisions. How can decisions be accepted as being or
having a sense of legitimacy? Each of us probably has our own notion,
but I would suggest that the idea of advocacy, as discussed by Professor
Jones, can play a central function in this area.
I see the ideas of advocacy and the adversary process within technology assessment, or within any planning operation, as having merit in
at least two main ways. One is the explicit recognition and acceptance of
the value component. The second is that advocacy increases the possibility of participating in the process of making social decisions, thereby
enhancing the legitimacy of the decisions made. As a result I think that
the criteria we should use for persons who are involved in this advocacy
is not just expertise, but something quite different, and that is wisdom.
This is not an original thought on my part by any means, but I think
that it is an important one.
This participation aspect is, I believe, the major way to counter
the elitism in the processes that we have been discussing. Within a
democracy the facilitation of increased participation is the only way
to allow the posing of the correct question, which I see as a much more
important and a more fundamental step than attempting to find the
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correct answer. If we accept the fact that posing the correct question
must come before ascertaining the correct answer, value considerations
necessarily enter into the assumptions we must make in considering the
various alternatives.
Everyone, it seems to me, gets assistance in deciding upon possible
alternatives except the public. Mr. Huddle told us about the increased
assistance that Congress is going to get. The Executive Branch has
many operations, such as OST and the Science Advisory Committee,
to do this. I would like to see a "P"SAC with the "P" standing for
Public, i.e. the Public Science Advisory Committee. In this regard I see
the activities of people like Margaret Mead and those of the Scientist
Public Information Movement, as being extremely important methods
by which scientists are attempting to bridge the gap from the technical
to the public policy dimension. Unfortunately, for some unknown
reason, such activities are usually played down at conferences such as
this. And yet to my mind, this is one of the few sane developments on
the national scene.
Ralph Nader has remarked, in one context, that the era of intermediaries is over. I think he is right in the sense of intermediaries being
independent entities through which people are expected to channel and
funnel their activities. But I do not think the era of advocates is over
in the sense of the advocate being the agent, and assisting his client,
group, or person, whomever they may be. I feel that the era of advocates
is actually just beginning.

